Scholarly and popular histories of Kenya largely agree that African Second World War veterans played a central role in the Kenya Land Freedom Army. Former African members of the colonial security forces have reinforced these assumptions by claiming to have been covert Mau Mau supporters, either after their discharge, or as serving soldiers. In reality, few Mau Mau generals had actual combat experience. Those who served in the colonial military usually did so in labor units or support arms. It therefore warrants asking why so many Kenyans accept that combat veterans played such a central role in the KLFA and in Kenyan history. Understanding how veterans of the colonial army have become national heroes, both for their wartime service and their supposed leadership of Mau Mau, reveals the capacity of popular history to create more useful and inclusive forms of African nationalism.
In boasting that Dedan Kimathi escaped capture by masquerading as a European policeman in the novel Weep Not, Child, Ngugi wa Thiong'o gave voice to the commonly held Kenyan assumption that the famed Mau Mau general acquired his military expertise and guile in the British military during the Second World War. From late , when he fled into the forests of central Kenya to take up arms against the colonial regime, until his arrest in the fall of , Kimathi's fame grew as he taunted the Kenyan government in a barrage of letters that claimed credit for the Kenya Land Freedom Army's (KLFA)  success in standing up to the military might of the British Empire. The colonial security services burnished his reputation by singling him out as the leader of a daring raid on a This, then, is the story of how a popular belief became embedded in both scholarly histories of Kenya and Kenya's nationalist imagination. Clarifying this misconception is not just an exercise in historiographical precision. Documenting the actual influence that veterans, particularly that of educated soldiers with clerical training, had on the KLFA provides a more nuanced understanding of the origin, character, and legacy of the insurgency. It also helps to explain how contemporary Kenyans have come to regard both Mau Mau fighters and colonial soldiers as heroes whose brave struggles with a foreign colonial regime helped to bring forth a new Kenyan nation.
There can be little doubt that African veterans played a role in the Mau Mau Emergency. At the very least, many of the nearly , rank-and-file Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru soldiers who served in the Second World War must have been passive supporters of the insurgency. This is not particularly significant given that the colonial authorities estimated that  per cent of the entire Kikuyu population had taken at least one Mau Mau oath.
 But the over-emphasis on combat in popular Kenyan narratives of Mau Mau obscures the most significant influence that Kikuyu ex-servicemen had on the KLFA. By assuming that all Kenyan soldiers were infantrymen, popular and professional historians alike have failed to realize that most Kikuyu veterans actually served in labor and specialist units. This meant that their main contribution to the KLFA was clerical and logistical rather than tactical. While literacy and accounting did not necessarily win battles, these skills were essential to building and motivating armies. Distinctions between the combat infantryman, the army clerk, and the military laborer have blurred in popular Kenyan imaginations, as have distinctions between the askaris who served the colonial regime and the KLFA men who fought them, to the point where a more inclusive form of Kenyan nationalism is emerging. After independence, Jomo Kenyatta's declaration that 'we all fought for uhuru' (freedom) allowed KAR askaris, KLFA fighters, and even the 'loyalists' who had rejected the Mau Mau call to arms to become citizens in good standing. The pride of place assigned to Second World War veterans in Mau Mau narratives helped paper over the inconvenient reality that, as Daniel Branch has noted, 'as many Kikuyu fought with the colonial government as did those against it'.  While historical precision is important, there is not much to be gained in exposing the fictive nature of Kenyan nationalist narratives. Popular nationalism is, by its very nature, an exercise in creative imagining. Even as early as , Ali Mazrui fully understood this reality: 'The idea of a Nation can sometimes be a little too abstract, and hence a little too cold. . . . To give the idea of a Nation warmth, it is often necessary either to personify it metaphorically or, more effectively, to give it specific human form in national heroes.' their wartime service and their supposed leadership of Mau Mau, reveals the capacity of popular history to create more useful and inclusive forms of African nationalism.
MILITARY VETERANS AND MAU MAU MYTHS
For both Kenyan nationalists and the colonial regime itself, military training in the colonial forces explained how an outnumbered and poorly equipped guerrilla force could hold the British Empire at bay for more than three years. Tom Mzungu, who served in the East African Army Medical Corps during the Second World War, was certain that military service nurtured Kenyan nationalism.
It was during the Second World War that the African became more aware of his place in overall human society. He became much more aware of his contribution to world affairs and the part he was playing in the liberation of individual and national freedom.

These sentiments became deeply embedded in Kenyan nationalist narratives. One of Ngugi's ex-serviceman characters confidently declared: 'We carried guns and we shot white men. . . . They are not the gods we had thought them to be. We even slept with their women.'
 Weep Not, Child is fiction, but the sentiments expressed in the novel reflected the widespread belief that military service taught askaris that they had nothing to fear from Europeans. The ex-Mau Mau supporters who Lauren Huttenbach met in Meru District were certain that their agemates who fought in the - campaign against the Japanese in Burma returned braver and more aggressive. 'We had big people there who were majors and sergeants. They learned to use guns. . . . When [they] were fighting [alongside Europeans], they called [them] "Mister", not "Boy".'  The image of Burma as a crucible that incubated Kenyan nationalism has even been written into Nairobi's built environment. Much like the way the First World War-era Carrier Corps base became the Kariorkor neighborhood, the city's Burma market was either a place where soldiers marshaled to deploy to Southeast Asia or gathered when they returned.

The fundamental flaw in the widely-accepted centrality of the Second World War and military service in Mau Mau historiography and popular nationalism is that most key Mau Mau figures had little military experience. Dedan Kimathi only served in the colonial military for a few months in  before deserting. The authors who note this reality generally attribute it to an insubordinate refusal to accept military discipline and dissatisfaction with his uniform and terms of service. Henderson claimed that Kimathi threw peanuts at a corporal, while Joseph Karimi depicted him defiantly slapping his commanding officer when ordered not to smoke.
 Either way, it is highly unlikely that Kimathi The Kenyan authorities and the East Africa Command (EAC) never kept precise or complete ethnic recruitment records for the entire war, particularly because civil and military recruiters could never be absolutely certain about the 'tribal' origins of African soldiers.

Today, Kenya's colonial era military personnel files are incomplete and largely uncatalogued. This may be due to simple mismanagement in the s or colonial service records may have been swept up in the British government's attempt to remove politically sensitive archival material before the transfer of power. Alexander Moradi used the 'attestation records' of , Kenyans for his study of the comparative health of African soldiers and civilians during the colonial era. We are about to go through the most difficult period in the history of European/African relationships in the Colony, and we have the new factor of the highly intelligent and educated ex-soldier to contest with. . . . With his opposition, which is only too easy to come by, and which is capable of unlimited exploitation by those who wish us ill, we shall indeed go through a bad period.

These fears proved groundless, and military intelligence estimates from the s make little mention of the military backgrounds of KLFA members, regardless of sensationalist press reports about Kimathi's experiences in Burma. Moreover, the first published memoirs of security service personnel in the early s portrayed Mau Mau fighters as gang members and fanatics rather than disciplined soldiers. 

West similarly asserted that 'Mau Mau bands' were 'composed mostly of war veterans from the Kikuyu ethnic group.'  While these misconceptions largely resulted from understandable historical mistakes, some individuals most likely invented military backgrounds to gain the status and respect associated with wartime service, much like the American impostors who claimed to have fought in the Vietnam or Iraq wars. The authors who exposed fake American veterans in the book Stolen Valor advised that the 'easiest way to spot phonies' is to note incompatibilities with their medals and alleged service details.
 This is a worthwhile exercise in the Kenyan context, where both specialist historians and ordinary Kenyans remain confused over the difference between British campaign medals, which were earned for serving in a specific theater of operations during the war, and decorations for heroism and bravery. According to Kenyan government documents, soldiers active in the Horn of Africa north of the Kenyan border during the Ethiopian campaign earned the 'Africa Star', those in uniform at any point during the conflict received a 'War Medal' and a '- Star', while those who served in any part of Burma, Assam, or Bengal received the 'Burma Star'. Many scholars and ordinary Kenyans take the Burma Star as proof that a man had combat experience, but as a semi-official history of the Burma campaign has pointed out: 'As many were awarded the Star for service in Calcutta and places which saw no fighting, some resentment arose amongst those who had endured the hardship of jungle warfare.'  Moreover, there was a strong incentive to appropriate medals from legitimate veterans in the years after the war because of the status that they conferred. By the s, a Second World War-era decoration was definitely not sufficient evidence to assume that the holder was an ex-serviceman, much less that he was a combat veteran. This accounts for some of the confused press reports that portrayed Kimathi as wearing the Burma Star and the over-inflation of the military credentials of key Mau Mau figures.

In East Africa, historically inaccurate or outright fraudulent claims are most easily recognized by simply noting where, when, and how an ex-serviceman was supposed to have served. 
THE REALITIES OF KENYAN MILITARY SERVICE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
There has been significant room for creative nationalist imagining in Kenya because scholarly and popular narratives of Kenyan history both tend to assume that the King's African Rifles was the sole military formation in colonial East Africa during the Second World War and that every African who served in the military during the war received some form of combat training. These are entirely understandable assumptions. During the interwar era, the KAR was indeed the de facto colonial army in the region. Consisting of lightly equipped infantry battalions recruited in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika (Tanzania), and Nyasaland (Malawi), its primary mission was internal security and, after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in , limited border defense. Most all KAR askaris during this period were infantrymen, apart from the handful of better educated men in rudimentary medical, transport, and signaling sub-units. During the Second World War, the War Office took over the KAR battalions from the Colonial Office and made the newly constituted East Africa Command responsible for organizing them into fully-equipped infantry brigades and divisions. Colonial administrators were responsible for recruiting African soldiers in their respective territories. These thoroughly modern formations required a full range of specialists and laborers to enable the more celebrated infantrymen to fight. Thus, in addition to the KAR battalions, East African veterans could have also served as drivers and mechanics in the East African Army Service Corps (EAASC), radiomen in the East African Signal Corps, nurses and dressers in the East African Army Medical Corps (EAAMC), and instructors and teachers in the East African Army Education Corps (EAAEC). There were also a host of smaller and more obscure units like the East African Army Chaplain's Department, the East African Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, and the East African Armoured Corps. colonial governments, raised the East African Military Labour Service and East African companies of the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (which also included units recruited in West Africa and the High Commission Territories in southern Africa). These labor units were entirely distinct and separate from the EAC's combat formations. While popular Kenyan nationalist narratives tend to gloss over these distinctions, the substantive differences in how the civil and military authorities recruited and trained East African soldiers had a direct impact on the capacity and inclination of Kenyan ex-servicemen to play a role in anticolonial struggles. As previously noted, most of the men who served in the better known KAR battalions were Ugandans, Tanganyikans, and Nyasalanders. This is not because there were insufficient recruits in Kenya. Rather, Kenyan colonial officials and settlers used their political influence in London to push the burden of military recruiting onto neighboring territories in the later years of the war.

Pointing out that the East Africa Command drew heavily on local manpower reserves in the early years of the war because Kenya was the springboard for the campaign to drive the Italians from Ethiopia, the Kenyan settlers secured favorable legislation that gave them privileged access to African labor via civil conscription and strict limits on military recruiting.
 The Kenyan authorities, who were generally sympathetic to the settlers' demands, also sought to ensure that mass recruiting and overseas service did not expose African soldiers to anticolonial nationalism and unsuitable social influences. These factors determined how individual Kenyans experienced military service. There were only a handful of frontline Kenyan KAR battalions by the end of the war, but Kenyans comprised the bulk of the East African Military Labour Service, the East African Army Service Corps and most of the other East African specialist units.
 While substantial numbers of them volunteered to serve, by  the Colonial Office allowed colonial governments to conscript men when necessary. Tanganyika had blanket conscription, but the official policy in Kenya and Uganda, which did not always hold in practice, was to only conscript men for the theoretically non-combatant units like the EAMLS and AAPC.

In addition to husbanding their African labor reserves, the Kenyan authorities were equally determined to prevent Kikuyu, Embu and Meru men from serving in combat units. Leaning heavily on the premise that some 'tribes' were more 'martial' than others, civil and military officials agreed that the Kikuyu lacked the character, if not biological constitution, to be effective soldiers. A  military report sweepingly declared that their 'poor physical' made them only suitable for non-combatant labor duties. 

This explains why Kikuyu askaris constituted only . per cent of the Kenyan KAR battalions in April , while  per cent of Kenyan infantrymen were from the supposedly more martial Kamba and Kalenjin communities. It is important to note that these statistics reflect the assumptions of civil and military officials, who, despite their claims of ethnographic expertise, often were not able to distinguish between one African community and another. In the Kikuyu case, it is entirely possible, if not likely, that some men joined the KAR by claiming to be Kamba.
 Overall, however, colonial recruiters channeled most Kikuyu volunteers and conscripts into labor, support, and clerical jobs (where their superior educational credentials were an asset).

These realities shaped the wartime experiences of key Mau Mau personalities that popular Kenyan nationalist narratives identify as ex-servicemen. Most of the scholarly and popular sources that offer specific details on Dedan Kimathi's military service agree that he detested being treated like a 'scavenger' while digging and cleaning latrines and hated having to wear short trousers and a 'closed collar jumper-coat'. This was the standard uniform of the East African Military Labor Service, which suggests that Karimi, who has Kimathi working at the Italian prisoner-of-war camp at Ndarugu, was wrong to say that upon enlistment he was taken to 'the King's African Rifles base' on Waiyaki Way for induction and military training.

More likely, Kimathi was swept up in the  through  military labor recruiting dragnet (which included both volunteers and conscripts). Members of the EAMLS were under military discipline but received virtually no combat training. Instead, they built roads and military installations and served as dockworkers, maintenance men, personal servants, and sweepers.
 Kimathi was undoubtedly a sweeper, which was the popular term for a 'Class III Sanitary Orderly'. As such, his duties would have included digging and operating latrines.  Given the unappealing nature of this assignment, it was small wonder that he was insubordinate. While Kimathi's military career lasted only three months, some sweepers did actually see combat. In , the Executive Officer of the African Section of the British Legion reported that he met a group of Embu ex-sweepers who, as members of an advanced surgical unit, had fought off a surprise Japanese attack in Burma.

Dedan Kimathi never had this experience as a military laborer, but Waruhiu Itote did. While Itote was unquestionably part of the Tanganyikan  KAR battalion in Burma, he was not, contrary to the popular nationalist narrative and his own autobiography, an infantryman. John Nunneley, who commanded a platoon in the battalion, distinctly recalled him as a mess steward.
 Itote wrote in his autobiography that he enlisted in Nairobi in  and received three months' preliminary training at the military camp at Ruiru. This was the main EAMLS depot where recruits learned military discipline before being assigned to specific labor duties or passed on to other units to fill basic support and labor roles. This is how the aforementioned EAMLS sweepers ended up in Burma. In Itote's case he was probably assigned to  KAR battalion to provide domestic comforts for European officers while it was training at Yatta in preparation for deployment overseas.

As one of only nine Kikuyu askaris in the almost entirely Tanganyikan battalion (the other eight men were probably also transfers from the EAMLS), it seems highly unlikely that Itote was, as he later claimed, a member of the battalion's intelligence section, the unit led by Captain Nunneley. Still, this did not mean that Itote did not face combat.  KAR was under considerable pressure in Burma because the battalion had relatively poor senior officers. The unit took high casualties in intense jungle fighting during the summer and fall of  and was eventually shifted out of the front lines to become  (EA) Division's headquarters defense battalion by the end of year.
 This meant that Itote would have had plenty of opportunities to come under fire while the battalion was on the front lines. Nunneley recalled a fellow officer teaching Itote how to use a submachine gun even though he was a mess steward because 'every man-jack fought if need be and certainly, when battalion headquarters was attacked by Japanese night-raiding jitter parties, there were no non-combatant duties'.  Itote was almost certainly embellishing when he wrote about the 'white heat of battle' blistering away colonial racism during intense jungle combat, and the chronology of his service in 'Mau Mau' General does not fit with  KAR's actual deployments, but it seems certain that he did experience combat in Burma. Bildad Kaggia was not a combat veteran, but he did serve as an African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps clerk in the deserts of North Africa and Cairo, and even in Britain. The details of Stanley Mathenge's service are extremely sketchy, but it seems most likely that he was also a member of an AAPC company in North Africa. Like the EAMLS, the East Africa Command intended the AAPC to be a non-combatant labor unit. The difference between the two wartime formations was that the AAPC was to work behind the lines in combat theaters, while the EAMLS was for domestic East African service only. 'Auxiliary' pioneers from throughout the empire, including the West Indies, India, Palestine, and West and southern Africa, provided the manpower and logistical support that allowed Britain to wage war on a global scale.
 In , the Middle East
Command asked the East African governments to provide non-combatant labor to free more European troops for combat duties. The East African civil and military authorities cooperated because the victory over the Italians in Ethiopia had reduced demands on the EAMLS. This explains why North Africa, not Burma, should figure more prominently in Kenyan nationalist narratives. By the end of the war, the East African AAPC consisted of , men,  per cent of whom were Kenyans.

While the Middle East Command assured the colonial governments that the East African AAPC companies would be solely for guard and construction duties, in reality these askaris often saw more intense combat than their more celebrated counterparts in Southeast Asia. This was particularly the case after the German capture of Tobruk in  when  Company ran into a German ambush during the disorganized British retreat from the fortified Libyan port. Over two hundred men died, while roughly fifty more became prisoners-of-war. This was not an isolated case. In another instance four AAPC companies suffered heavy losses when an Axis bombing raid on the Abu Hagag railway station touched off a literal fire storm.
 It is little wonder that veterans of the AAPC, several of whom sustained debilitating wounds, bitterly recalled losing comrades to enemy fire with little or no military training to prepare them for the rigors of combat.

Bildad Kaggia did not experience this sort of trauma during his service in North Africa. He was, however, acutely aware of the Middle East Command's substandard training and treatment of the East African AAPC companies. He enlisted because he could not afford the fees for the prestigious Alliance High School and because, as a devout Christian, he heard that soldiers on leave could visit Jerusalem. Kaggia wrote in detail about these wartime experiences in his autobiography, also published by Nottingham's East African Publishing House, The Roots of Freedom. A keen political observer, he took note of the [The British] knew we were good fighters but no black man was made a General although those white soldiers who were supposed to lead us preferred to stay in the rear and leave us to die at the front. We saw all those tricks, and from them, we learnt a lot.

Yet there is no surviving direct evidence that Mathenge was ever in the KAR or Burma. Unlike Itote, Kimathi, Kaggia, and Ngei, the colonial security services never had a chance to interrogate him, nor did he leave any written memoirs. Instead, he simply disappeared from the Kenyan forests in the mid-to late s. While he most likely died in combat, many popular Kenyan nationalist narratives record that he escaped with a band of followers to Ethiopia.

We will probably never know Mathenge's actual fate, but what seems most likely is that he was a member of one of the East African AAPC companies that deployed to the Middle East in . Mathenge's wife Miriam Muthoni told interviewers that she met him in  in the northern town of Kitale when he had just returned from Egypt and was en route to Burma. The East African combat formations were already in Burma by this time, and the East Africa Command did not redeploy Middle East AAPC companies to Southeast Asia. However, the Middle East Command did try to improve morale in the AAPC by granting East African soldiers leave. In many cases these leave parties traveled through the Sudan, and so if Mathenge was coming home on leave in  he might well have passed through Kitale and met his future wife. This would also explain how, according to Wachanga, he could claim to have seen Jerusalem. Apart from the askaris of  KAR, no East African infantrymen would have had the opportunity to visit Palestine during the war.


SWORDS VS PENS IN THE MAU MAU WAR
While the precise involvement of Second World War veterans in Mau Mau is difficult to discern exactly, there is little doubt that the roughly , Kenyans who served during  vo l .   , n o .  the war left the military with high expectations. Wartime propaganda told them repeatedly that they saved the world from tyranny, and it was understandable that they expected tangible rewards for their heroism. Noting the laudatory press reports of East African exploits in Burma, Jomo Kenyatta gave voice to these aspirations by asking: 'Surely [the soldiers] are entitled to a finer expression of gratitude from their British trustees?'

Most East African veterans were disappointed by the colonial regime's failure to reward them for their service, but rarely did their grievances lead to significant unrest. The image of the worldly but angry African ex-serviceman was based more on colonial phobias than on actual instances of veteran political subversion. The Kenyan authorities recalled that many of the founding members of the Kikuyu Central Association had been in the Carrier Corps during the First World War, and the subversive activities of British First World War veterans in the immediate years after that war suggested that Kenyan ex-servicemen might become equally dangerous.
 These fears became widespread among the Kenyan settlers as the Second World War drew to a close. In calling for special measures to discipline returning soldiers, a letter to the The Times warned that the return of a slouch hat-wearing 'undisciplined lout' (the slouch hat was part of the EAC's standard battle dress) to African villages 'may well jeopardize the whole fabric of indirect rule'.

In practice, however, there were actually very few cases of organized unrest or resistance by ex-servicemen. This was due in large part to the Kenyan government's successful 'reabsorption' policies that provided vocational training to skilled veterans, while returning most illiterate infantrymen and military laborers to the countryside.
 Yet, as Frank Furedi notes, the fall of Singapore to Japanese troops in , the mass refusal of an entire East African infantry brigade to deploy from Eritrea to Madagascar that same year, and suspicions that African soldiers were picking up subversive ideas from South Asian nationalists and African American soldiers created a widespread perception that returning African troops would threaten settler colonialism in Kenya  This was against the backdrop of much larger postwar anxieties about how Britain would retain its position as a global power and reestablish control over its empire 'east of Suez'.

Widespread discussion of the dangers posed by African veterans in the press further reinforced these perceptions in both the public imagination and popular Kenyan nationalist narratives. Edward Grigg, a former Kenyan governor and Conservative member of the House of Lords, blamed 'demobilized askaris for spreading discontent everywhere', and the notorious Corfield Report attributed the Mau Mau revolt in part to 'thousands of the younger generation of Kikuyu, many of whom had traveled far afield and had tasted some of the less respectable fruits of civilization'.
 On the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Kenyan nationalist historian Ali Mazrui came to a similar conclusion:
The war . . . humanized white men in the eyes of their African comrades as they fought together in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Malaya and elsewhere. To witness a white man scared to death under fire was itself a revelation to many Africans, who had previously seen white men only in their arrogant commanding postures as a colonial elite.

There is actually little evidence that African soldiers were emboldened by the British Empire's wartime weakness, and most never accepted European claims of racial superiority, but these sorts of assumptions underpinned the stereotype of the racialized ex-serviceman.
To be sure, a great many veterans were embittered by the colonial regime's poor treatment of disabled comrades and its refusal to pay service pensions to healthy men.
 Seeking to better their lives by making use of their worldly experiences and military training, many Kikuyu soldiers sought to organize themselves into trading cooperatives. Pooling their pay and discharge benefits, they planned to open bakeries and soap factories, launch bus and transport companies using surplus army vehicles, and even purchase a dried vegetable plant from the Kenyan government. Few of these projects ever came to fruition, much less were successful. In some cases, naive former soldiers lost their investments simply because they underestimated the expense and effort involved in launching a business, but the Kenyan government also played a direct role in thwarting their ambitions by refusing to issue transport and trading licenses. Claiming that the primitive economies of the 'native reserves' could not support too many entrepreneurial ventures, the colonial regime claimed that it was protecting veterans from the risks of free market capitalism.

Frustrations over this self-serving paternalism compounded longstanding Kikuyu grievances over land and unemployment. While the government rewarded a relatively small group of trusted non-commissioned officers with chieftainships and other positions of responsibility, a great many, if not most, Kikuyu veterans sympathized with the angry young men who founded the Kenya Land Freedom Army. This is how the stereotypical frustrated ex-serviceman became linked with Kikuyu militancy in Mau Mau historiography.
However, it is difficult to determine exactly how many veterans were active in the radicalized urban 'crowd' of taxi drivers, petty traders, thieves, prostitutes, and unemployed laborers that Frank Furedi took to be the 'vanguard of nationalist movement'. Imprecise wording in The Myth of 'Mau Mau' suggested that the leaders of these radicals were ex-servicemen. The loss, or intentional destruction, of most colonial-era military personnel records make it virtually impossible to determine where and when Kenyan Second World War veterans actually served. This allowed surviving KLFA men like Itote and later generations of nationalist historians to inflate the military credentials of the Mau Mau 'generals'. Yet this military myth making, which was hardly unique to Kenya, tends to obscure evidence, which suggests that relatively ordinary Kikuyu ex-servicemen, some who were indeed veterans of Burma, played some role in the KLFA. In the summer of , Fazan, who was then the East African Political Liaison Officer, took note of Kikuyu soldiers serving as clerks, signalers, servants, and medical dressers in Burma. Some  years later, the executive officer of the African Section of the British Legion, who was the former battalion commander of  KAR in Burma, reported that a significant number of the Mau Mau fighters and sympathizers in detention were ex-servicemen.

It is difficult, however, to assess published claims that these relatively ordinary veterans enhanced the combat capacity of the KLFA because the Mau Mau leadership, the colonial security forces, and nationalist historians all shared an interest in overstating the KLFA's combat capabilities. We do know, however, that it was not easy to defeat the insurgency. Against the active forest fighters, whose strength historians have put -, men and women, the British government deployed  infantry battalions (six KAR and six British Army), armored cars, artillery batteries, engineering units, and medium bombers.
 The insurgents were armed with homemade guns and a few stolen rifles and submachine guns. In , the East Africa Command's Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations concluded that the KLFA's immediate aim was to 'expand the security threat to an extent which will be beyond the capacity of the [Kenyan] Government to contain', but it dismissed the guerrilla bands as more effective in 'intimidating the population' than in actual combat.

Be that as it may, it took nearly four years to break the rebel's will to resist. In , the security forces struggled to protect the settler population during operations that Huw Bennett has deemed 'quite seriously flawed'.
 Faced with questions in Parliament and the British press as to why it was so difficult to defeat such a lightly armed force, the British military commanders cast the rebels as proficient jungle fighters. A  briefing by the Director of Operations declared: 'Good initiative is displayed by the leaders and the gangs are well disciplined. Their training is not to be despised, except in musketry', and the EAC's anti-Mau Mau operations handbook similarly praised the KLFA's ability to maneuver in the forests: 'The Mau Mau are fleet of foot, silent in movement, highly experienced in fieldcraft.'  These excuses helped substantiate assumptions that senior KLFA leaders were Second World War veterans.  These narratives are difficult to reconcile with the Mau Mau generals' relative lack of actual combat experience. Rank-and-file forest fighters most likely held the better equipped colonial forces at bay for so long because they were organized, brave, and enjoyed the support of the majority of the Kikuyu community. The nationalist historiography's attempt to portray the KLFA as a powerful conventional military force obscures one of its greatest strengths, namely that its leaders were, as Tabitha Kanogo rightly notes in her biography of Dedan Kimathi, more proficient with the pen than the rifle.
 As Derek Peterson has pointed out, literate Kikuyu partisans turned Western bureaucratic rules and rituals to their own ends. In 'contracting colonialism' they blunted the force of foreign rule by creating rival independent churches, schools, sports leagues, cooperatives, and other civil institutions. During the Mau Mau war, the KLFA leaders similarly used their literacy and understanding of bureaucratic conventions to mobilize the Kikuyu community and publicize their cause at home and abroad. Using registers, inventories, and war diaries, Dedan Kimathi and his lieutenants established a rival government in the forests. 

Mathenge most likely died in combat, and the KLFA stood little chance of driving the British from Kenya by military means. On the other hand, the flood of letters and petitions that Kimathi sent to chiefs, colonial officials, Western newspapers, metropolitan parliamentarians, sympathetic socialists, and international leaders had practical value.
 The Mau Mau generals may have lacked conventional military expertise, but their literary skills gave them the means to organize an opposition government in the forests. By framing their cause as a struggle for land, justice, and the right of self-determination they also made it difficult for colonial apologists to justify the slaughter of 'British protected persons', particularly after the security forces's human rights abuses came to light in the late s. While the KLFA was not a particularly potent conventional military force, their leaders' success in contracting colonialism gave their movement coherency and meaning, which helped ensure that the colonial regime could not 'win' the peace that followed its military victory over the insurgents. At the very least, Kimathi and the Mau Mau memorialists succeeded in supplanting the unflattering colonial depictions of their movement that were embodied in the Corfield Report. Moreover, literacy did have military value. Many senior KLFA men and Mau Mau sympathizers like Bildad Kaggia, Gakaara wa Wanjau, and Elijah Kinyua Ngang'a were effective leaders and organizers precisely because they were former clerks. The Kenyan administration's reliance on educated African bureaucratic labor was a clear vulnerability. In the late s, Kikuyu storemen working in the EAC's main armament stores at Gilgil organized the theft of thousands of rounds of ammunition.
 General Bahati gained access to important government documents while doing clerical work at the Jeanes School, which was a significant intelligence outpost during the Mau Mau war. Similarly, the African staff of the government-sponsored Swahili-language newspaper Baraza helped African clerks in the Secretariat smuggle 'top secret' material to the insurgents.  Some of this material most likely had tactical value, and the activities of this literate 'fifth column' probably played a role in the KLFA's ability to acquire weapons and avoid potentially decisive pitched battles against the better-equipped security forces. Their leadership and heroism stemmed not from their military expertise but from their willingness to pit their literary expertise and rudimentary tactical skills against a larger and better-equipped Western army. Similarly, the King's African Rifles battalions that helped defeat the KLFA were effective fighting formations because their African troops largely obeyed orders and killed forest fighters, even though some soldiers may have sympathized with the KLFA's cause. But it is not particularly useful to dwell on such realities outside of conventional historical monographs and scholarly journals. To be sure, it is worthwhile to guard against allowing nationalist histories to legitimize corruption and authoritarianism. But, in an era when every election cycle threatens to turn violent, and struggles over land and patronage continue to divide Kenyans, popular narratives that now recall Mau Mau fighters and KAR askaris as nation-builders who shared the common experience of oppressive and exploitive foreign colonial rule can help new generations embrace a shared and unifying history of struggle, sacrifice, and heroism.
